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What is a scientific discovery? T.S. Kuhn (1962b, 1962a) claimed that a discovery always involves not 
only a discovery-that (the observation of the discovered object) but also a discovery-what (the correct 
conceptualization of the discovered object); one without the other is insufficient for a discovery. Kuhn 
also distinguished between two broad classes of discovery: discoveries in which the discovery-that is 
being made before the discovery-what (one may refer to those discoveries as that-what discoveries), 
and vice versa, discoveries in which the discovery- what is being made before the discovery-that (what-
that discoveries).  
 
Each class of these discoveries comes with distinctive features, whereby the former Kuhn considered the 
more interesting ones. 
 
 This paper will defend Kuhn’s distinction between the two types of discovery and their characteristics 
against alternative accounts of discovery proposed by Achinstein (2001), Hudson (2001), and McArthur 
(2011). It will be argued that these alternative accounts are inappropriate, in large part, because they 
have fallen behind Kuhn’s insights. Yet there some aspects in Kuhn’s account of discovery that are 
vague. This paper will seek to make these aspects more precise. 
 
 For T.S. Kuhn, ”discovering a new sort of phenomenon is necessarily a complex event, one which in- 
volves recognizing both that something is and what it is” (Kuhn 1996, 55). It would be a mistake, 
according to Kuhn, to ”assimilate” discoveries in science to the (naively construed) act of seeing or to 
other sense perceptions (ibid.). Rather a discovery, for Kuhn, not only involves the observation of an 
object, but also the correct conceptualisation of that object. Kuhn’s main example for illustrating this 
point is the discovery of oxygen. Although Joseph Priestley was arguably the first to have isolated 
oxygen, he did not conceptualise it correctly. Rather, working within the theoretical framework of the 
phlogiston theory, Priestley thought that he had discovered dephlogisticated air, i.e., air that depleted of 
phlogiston. Lavoisier, according to Kuhn, can not be said to have discovered oxygen either, because also 
his conception of oxygen was mistaken: he believed that oxygen gas was a combination of oxygen (i.e., 
the ‘principle’ of acidity) combined with caloric, the (non-existent) matter of heat. On the other hand, 
without the requirement of the correct conceptualisation of the thing discovered, we would have to say 
that oxygen was discovered by anybody who ever bottled impure oxygen since Priestley himself did not 
manage to isolate a pure sample of oxygen (54). All we can say then, according to Kuhn, is that oxygen 
was discovered sometime in the period of 1774 until 1777. More generally, discoveries are ”not isolated 
events, but extended episodes” where it is largely arbitrary to identify any one scientist as the 
discoverer of a scientific object (ibid., 52). 
 
 Interestingly, in a paper published in Science in 1962 (reprinted in 1977), which formed the basis for 
chapter six of <i>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</i> (published in the same year), Kuhn made a 
distinc- tion between two basic kinds of discoveries (which he no longer makes explicitly in The 
Structure). In one kind of discovery, the conceptualisation is carried out before the object in question is 
being observed: these are classic cases of prediction, such as the discovery of missing elements in the 
periodic table, the neutrino, and radio waves (1977, 166-7). But given that that these discoveries were 
anticipated (usually, but not always, on theoretical grounds), they are ”an occasion only for 
congratulations, not for surprise”; they are thus prime examples for normal science activity, which does 
not aim for surprising novelties (Kuhn 1996, 58). In contrast, in discoveries of the second kind, the 
conceptualisation of the thing discovered usually follows the observation of the thing discovered. Those 
discoveries may be referred to as that-what discoveries. It is those discoveries that Kuhn considered 
”troublesome” and which he made the main focus of chapter six in <i>The Structure</i>. 
 
According to Kuhn, that-what discoveries have sharply distinct characteristics from what-that 
discoveries.  
 
Whereas what-that discoveries can be instantaneous with regard to the incidence of the discovery-that 
(1977, 171), only rarely give rise to priority debates (166-7), and where, accordingly, ”only a paucity of 
data can prevent the historian from ascribing [discoveries] to a particular time and place” (167), the 
contrary is the case in that-what discoveries. In that-what discoveries (such as in the discovery of 
oxygen), there necessarily is a time-dimension to discoveries, for it simply takes time to conceptualise a 
thing for which one had no, or only an inapppropriate, conception at the time of observation (1996, 55). 
The necessary time dimension of that-what discoveries, regularly involving several individuals, is 
therefore a major reason for why an attribution of a discovery to any one individual is ”often 
impossible” and to a moment in time is ”always imposssible” (55). In that-what discoveries there are 
thus ”no benchmarks to inform either the scientist or the historian when the job of a discovery has been 
done” (1977, 167). Although not all discoveries may fall neatly in either the what-that or the that-what 
category (ibid., fn on 167), Kuhn clearly thinks that most cases do. Whether that is the case or not will 
not be decided in this paper. What this paper will confirm, though, is that there are important cases of 
discovery that are well-captured by Kuhn’s account and in fact much better than by alternative accounts 
of scientific discovery. 
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